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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Vincent Jaramillo appeals from the judgment entered upon his convictions 
for felony fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, felony DUI, grand theft, 
and being a persistent violator of the law. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In the late evening hours of June 25, 2012, Susan Morales was home 
alone when she heard a vehicle in her gravel driveway. (Tr.1, p.39, L.18 - p.41, 
L.13.) Mrs. Morales looked out the window and did not see anyone outside, but 
she noticed her pickup truck was missing. (Tr., p.41, Ls.14-22.) She 
immediately called her parents, and then the police, to report the vehicle stolen. 
(Tr., p.41, L.23 - p.42, L.12.) 
Within minutes of receiving the report of the stolen pickup truck, Bingham 
County Sheriff's deputies located it being driven well in excess of the posted 
speed limit on Highway 91. (Tr., p.71, L.19 - p.75, L.14, p.115, L.25 - p.116, 
L.23, p.151, L.23- p.154, L.7, p.198, L.11 - p.199, L.15.) The officers pursued 
the truck and attempted to stop it, but the driver of the truck refused to pull over. 
(Tr., p.75, L.21 - p.76, L.11, p.154, L.14- p.155, L.5, p.199, Ls.16-24.) A high-
speed chase ensued, ending only when the driver of the truck lost control of the 
1 The appellate record contains two separately bound volumes of transcripts. As 
used in this brief, the citation "Tr." refers to the volume containing the transcripts 
of the evidentiary portions of the two-day jury trial. 
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vehicle and drove it over a canal and into a muddy potato field. (Tr., p.76, L.7 -
p.79, L.23, p.155, L.3 - p.156, L.13, p.199, L.21 - p.200, L.6.) 
Deputy Croxford was the first officer on scene when the vehicle crashed 
into the field. (Tr., p.82, L.10 - p.83, L.18.) From his vantage point on the canal 
bank overlooking the field, the officer saw a white male "wearing light-colored 
shorts and a gray shirt, standing" on the passenger's side of the stolen vehicle. 
(Tr., p.82, L.10 - p.83, L.1.) When Deputy Croxford ordered the man to put his 
hands up, the man complied but then turned around and "took off running into 
the field." (Tr., p.83, Ls.2-8.) 
Deputies Hook and Jones arrived on scene at about that time and saw the 
male subject - whom Deputy Hook described as tall, skinny, Caucasian, and 
wearing shorts and "a gray, long-sleeved, hooded-type sweatshirt" (Tr., p.158, 
Ls.11-25, p.160, L.20)- running through the field (Tr., p.83, Ls.2-11, p.157, L.16 
- p.158, L.1, p.200, Ls.7-10, p.201, L.19 - p.202, L.4, p.202, L.25 - p.203, L.3). 
Deputy Hook chased the subject through the muddy field while Deputies 
Croxford and Jones inspected the stolen vehicle. (Tr., p.83, Ls.10-15, p.159, 
Ls.1-5, p.200, Ls.10-16.) After determining there were no other suspects in or 
near the vehicle, Deputies Croxford and Jones joined the foot pursuit. (Tr., p.84, 
Ls.2-10, p.92, L.23 - p.93, L.21, p.125, L.12 - p.126, L.11, p.200, Ls.16-17, 
p.201, Ls.7-18.) The deputies were unable to catch up to the subject and 
eventually lost sight of him. (Tr., p.84, Ls.11-24, p.160, L.24 - p.161, L.10.) 
While the sheriff's deputies were chasing the subject through the field, 
other law enforcement agents, including Blackfoot City Police Officer Dalley, 
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patrolled the surrounding streets. (Tr., p.133, Ls.7-14, p.161, Ls.11-13, p.186, 
L.13 - p.187, L.23.) Shortly after the deputies lost sight of the subject, the 
occupants of a vehicle travelling on a road adjacent to the filed alerted Officer 
Dalley that "the guy [the officers] were looking for was right behind their vehicle." 
(Tr., p.187, L.25 - p.188, L.4.) Officer Dalley drove past the bystanders' vehicle 
and saw a man, who the officer subsequently identified as Jaramillo, standing in 
the road. (Tr., p.188, L.5 - p.189, L.1.) Jaramillo was holding his shoes, "he had 
mud all over his legs and all over his shorts and also on his arms and shirt he 
was wearing," and he had "a very strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from 
him." (Tr., p.189, L.5 - p.190, L.1; see also Tr., p.86, Ls.8-14, p.90, Ls.1-25, 
p.164, Ls.7-18, p.191, Ls.6-24; State's Exhibits 25-37.) Deputies Croxford and 
Hook arrived on scene as Officer Dalley was taking Jaramillo into custody, and 
both deputies identified Jaramillo as the suspect they had been chasing. (Tr., 
p.84, L.25 - p.86, L.14, p.158, L.11 - p.159, L.24, p.161, Ls.14-18, p.164, Ls.7-
18, p.171, Ls.20-23, p.188, L. 7 - p.189, L.4, p.190, Ls.4-6.) 
The state charged Jaramillo with felony fleeing or attempting to elude a 
peace officer, grand theft, felony DUI, and a persistent violator enhancement 
(R., pp.251-57.) Following a trial, a jury found Jaramillo guilty of the three 
substantive offenses (R., pp.313-14), and Jaramillo pied guilty to the DUI and 
persistent violator enhancements (Tr., p.285, L.20 - p.290, L.21 ). The district 
court entered judgment and imposed concurrent unified sentences of 14 years, 




Jaramillo states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the prosecutor's unobjected-to elicitation of testimony 
concerning Mr. Jaramillo's post-arrest request for an attorney and 
post-arrest silence violate his rights under the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution and constitute fundamental error? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Jaramillo failed to carry his burden of showing fundamental with respect to 
his unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
Jaramillo Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His 
Unpreserved Claim Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
Officer Dalley is the officer who arrested Jaramillo on the night he stole a 
vehicle, drove while intoxicated and attempted to elude police. At trial, the 
prosecutor asked Officer Dalley whether Jaramillo said anything to the officer 
after he had been taken into custody, and the officer responded, "He said he was 
walking to Blackfoot." (Tr., p.189, Ls.2-14.) The following exchange then 
occurred: 
Q [by the prosecutor]. Okay. So what did you do once you had 
him in custody? 
A. I placed him in the backseat - well, he was in the backseat of 
my patrol car, and I transported him to the court house to the jail, 
outside the sally port. 
Q. And what did you do then? 
A. I asked him if he needed EMS to come check him out. 
Q. And what did he indicate? 
A. He said "No. But I want my attorney." 
Q. Okay. Did you transport him to the hospital as well? 
A. I did. 
Q. And what was the purpose of that? 
A. To assist Deputy Croxford in the blood draw. 
(Tr., p.190, Ls.2-16.) Immediately after this exchange, the prosecutor asked 
Officer Dalley a series of questions regarding Jaramillo's physical appearance 
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when he was taken to the hospital on the night of his arrest. (Tr., p.190, L.17 -
p.191, L.24.) The prosecutor then asked, "Other than what you've already 
testified to, did the defendant say anything else to you that night?" and the officer 
responded, "No, he did not." (Tr., p.192, Ls.11-14.) In what the prosecutor 
subsequently explained was an attempt to elicit testimony from the officer 
regarding a specific statement Jaramillo did make (see Tr., p.220, Ls.4-23), the 
prosecutor asked, "Did he indicate to you how he came to be in the middle of 
Mitchell Lane?" (Tr., p.192, Ls.15-16). Before the officer could answer, defense 
counsel interposed a "leading" objection, at which point a bench conference 
occurred off the record. 2 (Tr., p.192, Ls.17-21.) Following the bench 
2 The trial court later summarized the substance of the discussion that took place 
during the bench conference, as follows: 
[T]here was a statement made or question asked "Other than what 
you've already testified, did the defendant say anything else to you 
that night?" The answer was "No, he did not." There was then 
another question that was objected to as being leading. I had 
counsel approach. 
One of the things I was concerned about was it would 
appear to me that we were getting close to commenting on the 
defendant's right to remain silent. I didn't want to get close to that. 
And based upon the officer's answer to the previous question that 
he didn't say anything else, I didn't think that any further 
questioning along that line was appropriate, and so I informed 
counsel of that concern. 
(Tr., p.220, Ls.5-17.) When asked by the court whether that was "a fair 
representation" of what transpired during the bench conference, the prosecutor 
responded, "It is, Your Honor. I think I also indicated that I believed that there 
was an additional statement that had been made, and that's what I was trying -
that he had actually heard." (Tr., p.220, Ls.18-23.) The court concurred with the 
prosecutor's representation and added, "And I think I told you you could try and 
ask a question that would get that." (Tr., p.220, Ls.24-25.) 
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conference, the prosecutor concluded his direct examination of Officer Dalley by 
asking, "So as I understand it, Officer Dalley, the only contact you had with Mr. 
Jaramillo was to take him into custody that night?" to which Officer Dalley 
responded, "Correct." (Tr., p.192, Ls.22-25.) 
For the first time on appeal, Jaramillo argues the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by eliciting from Officer Dalley "testimony concerning his [Jaramillo's] 
post-arrest request for an attorney and his post-arrest silence." (Appellant's 
brief, p.5.) Although Jaramillo recognizes he did not preserve this issue by way 
of a timely objection below, he nevertheless contends review is proper - and 
reversal is necessary - because, he argues, the alleged misconduct "was 
fundamental error in violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." 
(Id.) Jaramillo's argument fails. Correct application of the law to the facts of this 
case shows Jaramillo has failed to carry his burden of establishing fundamental 
error entitling him to reversal of his convictions. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a timely objection 
may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes fundamental error." State v. 
Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010). In the 
absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is 
strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being 
deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a 
fair tribunal." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). 
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Review without objection will not lie unless (1) the defendant demonstrates that 
"one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated;" (2) 
the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for 
any additional information" including information "as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must demonstrate that the 
error affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally by showing a 
reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the trial court 
proceedings." ~ at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
C. Jaramillo Has Failed To Carry His Burden Of Demonstrating Fundamental 
Error In Relation To His Unpreserved Claim Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
"The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as well as 
Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee a criminal defendant the 
right not to be compelled to testify against himself." State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 
53, 60, 253 P.3d 727, 734 (2011) (citing U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Idaho 
Const. art. I, § 13.) Just as these constitutional provisions confer upon a criminal 
defendant the right to remain silent, they also prevent the prosecution from 
commenting at trial on the defendant's exercise of that right. ~ (citing Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-14 (1965)). An exception to this prohibition exists 
in the case of pre-Miranda3 silence, which the prosecutor may use at trial for the 
purpose of impeaching the defendant. ~ (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 
U.S. 619-628-29 (1993); Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982)). Although 
the United States Supreme Court has not squarely addressed whether the 
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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prosecution may also use a defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as 
substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
consistently "held that a defendant's right to remain silent attaches upon custody, 
not arrest or interrogation, and thus a prosecutor may not use any post-custody 
silence to infer guilt in its case-in-chief." !st (citing State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 
814, 820-21, 965 P.2d 174, 180-81 (1998)). Use of a defendant's post-arrest 
request for an attorney for the purpose of inferring guilt likewise violates the 
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 567, 300 
P.3d 1046, 1055 (2013). 
Citing Ellington and Moore, Jaramillo argues for the first time on appeal 
that the prosecutor violated his constitutional right to remain silent, first by 
eliciting testimony from Officer Dalley that, when asked whether "he needed 
EMS to come check him out," Jaramillo responded, "No. But I want an attorney" 
(Tr., p.190, Ls.7-11) and, second, by eliciting testimony that, "Other than what 
[the officer] already testified to," Jaramillo did not "say anything else to [the 
officer] that night" (Tr., p.192, Ls.11-14). (Appellant's brief, pp.5-9.) Jaramillo 
has failed to carry his burden of establishing fundamental error in relation to the 
prosecutor's questioning of Officer Dalley because, contrary to Jaramillo's 
assertions, the complained of testimony did not clearly violate his constitutional 
rights, nor is there any reasonable possibility that it affected the outcome of the 
trial. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
The right against self-incrimination embodied in the federal and state 
constitutions "is not absolute ... and applies only when the silence is used solely 
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for the purpose of implying guilt." Moore, 131 Idaho at 821, 965 P.2d at 181, 
quoted in Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61, 253 P.3d at 735; accord Parton, 154 Idaho 
at 566, 300 P.3d at 1054. Thus, in order to establish the first two prongs of his 
fundamental error claim, Jaramillo must demonstrate that the prosecutor not only 
elicited testimony concerning his post-arrest request for an attorney and post-
arrest silence, but that he clearly did so for the impermissible purpose of implying 
Jaramillo's guilt. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 764-65 (1987) (no Fifth 
Amendment violation where fact of defendant's post-arrest silence was not 
submitted to jury for purpose of implying guilt). Rather than attempting to carry 
this burden by pointing to specific facts in the record that would demonstrate the 
complained of testimony was used for this improper purpose, Jaramillo simply 
argues the testimony elicited by the prosecutor in this case was similar to that 
found improper in Ellington and, therefore, amounted to a clear violation of his 
constitutional rights. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.) A comparison of the facts of 
Ellington to the facts of this case shows Jaramillo's arguments to be utterly 
without merit. 
In Ellington, the Idaho Supreme Court held the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by eliciting testimony from a detective that, after Ellington was placed 
under arrest, the detective "attempted" to interview him. 151 Idaho at 59-61, 253 
P.3d at 733-35. In concluding the prosecutor's questions and the detective's 
testimony amounted to an impermissible comment on Ellington's post-arrest 
silence, the Court reasoned: 
[l]t is unclear what the prosecutor's line of questioning regarding 
the fact that Mr. Ellington was not interviewed at that time was 
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being used to establish. However, the jury was likely to infer that 
the reason Sergeant Maskell only "attempted" to interview Mr. 
Ellington rather than actually interviewing him was because he 
chose to invoke his right to remain silent once he was put under 
arrest. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61, 253 P.3d at 735. Because the relevance of the 
prosecutor's line of inquiry was neither apparent from the record nor satisfactorily 
explained by the state on appeal, the Ellington Court concluded "[t]he fact that 
Mr. Ellington was not interviewed by the police was simply unnecessary 
testimony," the only conceivable purpose of which was to "draw attention to Mr. 
Ellington's post-arrest silence." kt The Court further concluded that, even if the 
prosecutor did not deliberately solicit the offending testimony, the testimony 
would nevertheless be imputed to the state because the officer, as a 
representative of the state, "had the same duty as the prosecutor not to 
improperly comment on Mr. Ellington's silence." kt Finally, the Court observed 
"there was absolutely no reason for the prosecutor to engage in this line of 
questioning in the first place, particularly given that he clearly knew the line of 
questioning would create a high risk of an improper comment on Mr. Ellington's 
silence" and, therefore, the Court held "there was misconduct." kt 
Unlike the line of questioning and testimony at issue in Ellington, the line 
of questioning and testimony at issue in this case was neither intended to imply 
Jaramillo's guilt from his silence, nor did it clearly have the effect of doing so. 
When Officer Dalley testified regarding Jaramillo's post-arrest request for an 
attorney, he did so in the context of having been asked what Jaramillo said when 
the officer asked "if he needed EMS to come check him out." (Tr., p.190, Ls.8-
11 
11.) There is no indication in the record that the prosecutor in this case could or 
should have known that her question would elicit that particular response, nor did 
the prosecutor in any way attempt to exploit the response for the purpose of 
having the jury infer Jaramillo's guilt based on his post-arrest request for an 
attorney. 
Moreover, while the officer's testimony is undoubtedly imputed to the 
state, see Ellington, supra, there is no danger that the jury actually drew any 
adverse inference from the fact that, after he was arrested, Jaramillo requested 
an attorney. Where the state presents evidence that a defendant refused to 
speak to police when given the opportunity to do so, there is an inherent risk that 
the jury will draw an inference that the defendant had something to hide. This 
same risk does not attend to the evidence of Jaramillo's post-arrest request for 
an attorney for at least two reasons. First, the request itself was not made in 
response to any police interrogation and, as such, did not even implicate 
Jaramillo's right to silence. Compare Parton, 154 Idaho at 567, 300 P.3d at 
1055 (Fifth Amendment violation occurred where prosecutor purposefully elicited 
testimony that defendant requested an attorney in response to post-arrest 
interrogation about his involvement in crime). Second, there are a variety of 
reasons a person who has just been arrested might request the assistance of an 
attorney - including for the purpose of arranging bail. Absent some indication 
the request was made to avoid police questioning, there is no reason to believe 
the jury drew the most damning inference possible from Jaramillo's desire for 
legal counsel. Because it is not at all clear from the record that the state 
12 
presented the evidence of Jaramillo's post-arrest request for an attorney for the 
purpose of implying Jaramillo's guilt, or that the jury actually considered the 
evidence for that impermissible purpose, Jaramillo's challenge to the testimony 
fails under the first two prongs of Perry. 
Jaramillo also claims the prosecutor committed fundamental error by 
eliciting testimony from Officer Dalley that, "[o]ther than what [the officer] already 
testified to," Jaramillo did not "say anything else" to the officer on the night of his 
arrest. (Tr., p.192, Ls.11-14.) This claim also fails under the first two prongs of 
Perry. Unlike the record in Ellington - which was silent as to the prosecutor's 
reasons for asking the witness about his unsuccessful attempt to interview the 
defendant following his arrest - the record in this case affirmatively shows that, 
in asking Officer Dalley whether Jaramillo said "anything else" after he was 
arrested, the prosecutor was attempting to elicit testimony about a statement 
Jaramillo actually made. The prosecutor explained as much to the district court 
during a bench conference, stating, "I believed that there was an additional 
statement that had been made, and that's what I was trying - that he had 
actually heard." (Tr., p.220, Ls.20-23.) Clearly, the prosecutor was not 
attempting to elicit evidence of Jaramillo's silence at all, much less to elicit it for 
the purpose of implying Jaramillo's guilt. Nor is there any reason to believe the 
jury construed the officer's testimony as a comment that Jaramillo refused to talk 
to the officer following his arrest. From the officer's testimony, it appears that the 
only direct question he asked Jaramillo was whether "he needed EMS to come 
check him out." (See generally Tr., pp.185-96.) That Jaramillo only responded 
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to that question and did not volunteer any other statements hardly demonstrates 
a circumstance from which the jury would naturally or reasonably infer Jaramillo's 
guilt. Jaramillo has failed to show a clear violation of his constitutional rights. 
Even if Jaramillo could satisfy the first and second prongs of Perry with 
respect to either of his claims of prosecutorial misconduct, he cannot establish 
the third prong, i.e., that the alleged errors affected the outcome of his trial. The 
state presented overwhelming evidence of Jaramillo's guilt. Specifically, two of 
the sheriff's deputies who responded to the report of the stolen vehicle positively 
identified Jaramillo as the individual who they chased through the muddy potato 
field. (Tr., p.85, L.14- p.86, L.14, p.104, L.22-p.105, L.2, p.134, L.22- p.135, 
L.2, p.143, Ls.14-17, p.158, L.8- p.159, L.24, p.162, Ls.16-19, p.171, Ls.20-23, 
p.204, L.20 - p.206, L.5.) Although none of the officers actually saw Jaramillo 
emerge from the vehicle, he was the only person standing near the vehicle after 
it crashed, there were no other persons in or near the vehicle, and the only 
footprints near the vehicle coincided with the direction in which Jaramillo fled on 
foot. (Tr., p.82, L.10-p.84, L.1, p.125, L.12-p.126, L.8, p.135, Ls.8-17, p.141, 
L.19 - p.142, L.7, p.201, Ls.7-18, p.202, L.5- p.203, L.19, p.205, L.15 - p.206, 
L.3, p.211, L.23 - p.212, L.18.) Shortly after the sheriff's deputies lost sight of 
Jaramillo, some bystanders spotted him on a street adjacent to the field. (Tr., 
p.84, L.25 - p.85, L.9, p.187, L.13 - p.188, L.9.) Although he was no longer 
wearing the grey sweatshirt two of the deputies had seen him in, he was wet and 
muddy, consistent with having run through the muddy potato field. (Tr., p.86, 
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Ls.8-14, p.90, Ls.1-25, p.134, L.22 - p.135, L.2, p.164, Ls.7-20, p.178, Ls.4-10, 
p.189, Ls.5-12; State's Exhibits 25-37.) 
Considering the above evidence, including the certainty with which each 
sheriff's deputy identified Jaramillo as the suspect they pursued through the field, 
there can be no question that any error in admission of Officer Dalley's testimony 
concerning Jaramillo's post-arrest request for an attorney and post-arrest silence 
did not affect the outcome of the trial and was therefore harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Jaramillo has failed to establish fundamental error entitling 
him to reversal of his convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon Jaramillo's convictions for felony fleeing or attempting to elude a police 
officer, felony DUI, grand theft and being a persistent violator of the law. 
DATED this 28th day of August 2014. 
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